



International commercial arbitration is often complex, frustrating and
expensive.' The complexity, frustration and expense are compounded
when, despite a long, expensive, and perhaps bitter proceeding, the losing
party does not voluntarily pay the award and further is able to deny or
delay the award's enforcement by raising all manner of objections and
exploiting any confusion or uncertainties in the arbitral award itself.
Many of the problems which typically complicate and delay an arbi-
tration proceeding and the eventual enforcement of the arbitral award can,
however, be removed or significantly diminished by a carefully drafted
arbitration clause. Such a clause, a model of which is provided later in
this article, will inevitably be longer than the "standard" arbitration clause
found in most international contracts and thus may not be appropriate
for short-form or simple agreements. The potential rights and benefits at
stake for the parties are, however, very significant, particularly when the
nature, circumstances or parties to the contract might lead one to believe
that an eventual arbitration is more than a remote possibility. Indeed,
many project contracts go into great detail to cover factual eventualities
which are, regretably, far less likely than an arbitration and a consequent
enforcement proceeding for an arbitral award. Moreover, a tightly drafted
arbitration clause that provides detailed mechanisms for the resolution of
disputes and the enforcement of an award permits the parties to have a
clearer awareness of the nature and consequences of an arbitration and
therefore to evaluate them with greater precision. Finally, many of the
* The author practices law in Paris. The author would like to thank Wesley R. Johnson,
Esq., who reviewed portions of this article and made a number of helpful suggestions.
I. It has, of course, been criticized on all these bases. See e.g., Layton, Is International
Arbitration a Viable Remedy for Disputes in the Middle East?, MIDDLE EAST EXECUTIVE
REPORTS, June 1983 at 14 [hereinafter Layton].
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provisions that are likely to make an arbitral award easier and quicker to
enforce are also likely to diminish the time and costs of the proceeding
itself. 2
I. Institutional or Ad Hoc Arbitration?
There have been many discussions and articles on the comparative
merits of so-called "institutional" arbitrations, administered by an exist-
ing arbitral body or institution such as the International Chamber of Com-
merce or the American Arbitration Association, and "ad hoc" arbitration
tribunals established and organized by the parties and their appointed
arbitrators. 3 Most of these discussions bear on the relative costs and
efficiency of institutional as opposed to ad hoc arbitration. But the issue
also has some bearing on enforcement of the award and, in turn, dictates
the manner in which the arbitration clause will be written.
A. INSTITUTIONAL ARBITRATION
The majority of international contracts (particularly those in Europe or
the Middle East) that provide for arbitration provide for it to be carried
out pursuant to the rules, and under the direction, of the International
Chamber of Commerce (ICC).4 Indeed, a vast number of contracts merely
recite the ICC's model arbitration clause 5 with perhaps the addition of a
choice-of-law or place-of-arbitration provision. As discussed below, the
model ICC clause, while succinct and widely recognized, may fail to
include many elements that would enhance the efficiency of the arbitration
proceeding and the possibility of enforcing the award rapidly.
2. See, e.g., Branson & Tupman, Selecting an Arbitral Forum: a Guide to Cost Effective
International Arbitration, 24 VA. J. INT'L LAW 917 (1984) [hereinafter Branson and Tupman],
in which the authors, after examining several alternatives, propose a detailed model arbi-
tration clause for ad hoc arbitration as being the most cost effective.
3. See, e.g., id. at 918-924; but cf. Craig, Park and Paulsson, INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER
OF COMMERCE ARBITRATION, para 4.03, at 2-3 (1984) [hereinafter Craig, Park and Paulsson]
(institutional arbitration clauses generally to be favored); see also Goekjian, Conducting an
ICC Arbitration Proceeding, MIDDLE EAST EXECUTIVE REPORTS, February 1980 at 1-2.
[hereinafter Goekjian].
4. ICC arbitrations filed in the three-year period from 1980-82 involved 875 parties from
Western Europe, 163 parties from North America, and 155 parties from the Middle East.
Craig, Park and Paulsson, supra note 3, Appendix I at 11-13. The three nationalities most
frequently represented during that period were France (255 parties), West Germany (157
parties) and the United States (120 parties). Id. at 14.
5. The ICC's model arbitration clause reads:
All disputes arising in connection with the present contract shall be finally settled under
the Rules of Conciliation and Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce by
one or more arbitrators appointed in accordance with the said Rules.
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The selection of institutional arbitration by the ICC does, however,
result in two potential advantages as to enforcement. The first is that the
ICC is the best known international arbitration body and one which is
widely respected. Thus the fact that an award bears the ICC's "cachet"
may give it greater international currency and engender confidence in the
judge (particularly in Europe) from whom the exequatur or enforcement
is requested.
The second, and related, advantage is that all ICC awards, whether
final or partial, must be submitted for prior review by the ICC's "Court
of Arbitration." 6 The Court may modify the form of the award and draw
the arbitrator's attention to points of substance which may have been
overlooked or inadequately treated. 7 There is, accordingly, a certain con-
sistency in ICC awards and a somewhat greater assurance that the award
will be coherent in substance and consistent in form. In at least one case
the Court of Arbitration apparently sent the draft final award back to the
arbitrators, all of whom were engineers, for clarification and rework three
times before it permitted the award to be signed and hence final.
8
The ICC's supervision of, and imprimatur on, an award may therefore
be a helpful factor in enforcing an award. The ICC Secretariat has ap-
parently reported that over 90 percent of ICC awards have been voluntarily
complied with by the losing party.9 The exact basis of this estimate is not
clear, and it does not appear to have been broken down by regions or
types of disputes. One should not, accordingly, assume that an ICC award
will necessarily result in rapid payment or easy enforcement. 10
There are numerous other institutional bodies which supervise inter-
national arbitration, notably the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce and
6. Article 21 of the Rules of the ICC Court of Arbitration [hereinafter ICC Rules]; see
also Craig, Park and Paulsson, supra note 3, at paras. 20.01-20.05. The "Court" of Arbi-
tration is, in fact, a committee made up of members nominated by the ICC National Com-
mittee which generally meets in full session once a month. See id. para 2.03 at 20.
7. ICC Rules, supra note 6, art. 21.
8. Based on the author's informal communications with members of the ICC staff, it
appears that the award is, as a practical matter, not returned to the arbitrators for modification
more than three times. As the Court cannot force the arbitrators to accept the Court's
suggestions and the arbitrators cannot force the Court to accept their award the theoretical
possibility of a deadlock exists, but this does not occur in practice. See Craig, Park and
Paulsson, supra note 3, para 20.01 at 118. An interesting description of the modifications
to the draft award which were suggested by the Court (and accepted by the majority of the
arbitrators) in the case of AB Gatoverken v. GNMTC is set forth in VI YEARBOOK COM-
MERCIAL ARBITRATION 140 (1981).
9. Craig, Park and Paulsson, supra note 3, para. 107 at 12 and para. 22.04 at 138.
10. Indeed, this author has recently been involved in the enforcement of two final, and
theoretically no longer appealable, ICC arbitral awards, both of which arose from contracts
in the Middle East. Enforcement was in both cases ultimately obtained against the losing
parties' assets in Europe, but only after long and expensive court battles in several juris-
dictions in which the losing parties raised all manner of opposition and objections.
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the American Arbitration Association. None of these bodies, however,
handles the large volume of international commercial arbitrations that the
ICC does (although the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce is reasonably
prominent in the arbitration of East-West disputes).
One arbitral institution worthy of particular note is the International
Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) which is affiliated
with the World Bank and which was established by multilateral conven-
tion.It One of the significant advantages of ICSID arbitration is that the
ICSID Convention provides its own mechanism for appealing and en-
forcing the award.12 The award may only be challenged by means of a
timely internal appeal pursuant to procedure provided in the ICSID Con-
vention. 13 In addition, state parties to the ICSID Convention must rec-
ognize a final ICSID award "as binding and enforce the pecuniary obli-
gations imposed by that award within its territories as if it were a final
judgment of a court in that State." 14 The major drawback to the use of
ICSID arbitration, however, is the narrow jurisdiction conferred by the
ICSID Convention. Cases under the ICSID Convention are essentially
limited to international "investment disputes" between private and state
parties both of whom are from countries that have ratified the ICSID
Convention.15 Despite active promotion of ICSID by its staff, there have
been relatively few ICSID arbitrations to date.
But while an institutional award may provide certain advantages as to
enforceability, these advantages ordinarily would not, in and of them-
selves, justify the choice of institutional arbitration, particularly in light
of the significant costs charged by some arbitration institutions.16 The
ultimate decision as to whether to provide for institutional or ad hoc
arbitration should focus on whether one or both of the parties perceives
1I. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals
of Other States, done Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, T.I.A.S. No. 6090, 475 U.N.T.S. 195
[hereinafter the ICSID Convention].
12. See generally, Branson and Thpman, supra note 2, at 935-36.
13. ICSID Convention, supra note 9, art. 52; see also ICSID Rules of Procedures for
Arbitration Proceedings, Rules 51-52 [hereinafter ICSID Rules].
14. ICSID Convention, supra note 9, art. 54(1); see also Societe Ltd. Benvenutti et
Bonfant v. Gouvennement de la Republique Populaire du Congo, June 26, 1981 (cour d'appel
de Paris, 1st chambre suppl.) excerpted in VII YEARBOOK COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 159-
61 (1982) (Article 54 of the ICSID Convention limits the power of the judge to examine the
authenticity of a certified ICSID award).
15. ICSID Convention, supra note 9, art. 25(l); see also Branson and Tupman, supra
note 2 at 923; Delaume, Arbitration with Governments: "Domestic" v. "International"
Awards, 17 INT'L LAWYER 687, 964-96 (1983).
16. The ICC, in particular, is often criticized as charging unduly high fees. See e.g.,
Layton supra, note I at 15. ICC fees are based on a sliding scale percentage of the total
amount (generally including both claims and counterclaims) in dispute. See ICC Rules,
supra note 6, Appendix III and Schedule of Conciliation and Arbitration Costs, art. 5.
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that it may be in need of the administrative support, supervision and,
perhaps, prodding which the arbitral institution can provide. In this con-
nection a number of commentators feel that ad hoc arbitration is ineffec-
tive and ultimately more expensive than institutional arbitration in cases
involving complex commercial matters or contracts between industrial-
ized and developing countries. 17
When a party has, in light of the above factors, significant doubts as
to whether ad hoc arbitration is appropriate, it would appear prudent to
opt for an arbitration clause providing for institutional arbitration. This
is because the parties, once a dispute arises, can agree to amend their
original agreement by providing for a presumably less expensive ad hoc
arbitration on agreed terms. If the parties cannot agree on the terms for
an ad hoc arbitration, 18 then either party can commence institutional
arbitration pursuant to the contract's arbitration clause. This process is
unlikely to work in reverse, as it must be assumed that the party wishing
to delay or, perhaps, confuse arbitration would not agree to replacing an
ad hoc arbitration by one involving institutional supervision.
B. AD HOC ARBITRATION
When ad hoc arbitration is chosen, however, the parties are free to
select the rules to be applied in the arbitration. Of particular note in this
regard are the Arbitration Rules of the United Nations Commission on
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), 19 which are increasingly popular
as a basis for proceeding to ad hoc arbitration. 20 The UNCITRAL rules
have gained wide acceptance both in the West and in developing countries
and were, with some modifications, selected as the rules for the Iran-
United States Claims Tribunal in The Hague.
As ad hoc arbitration proceeds without the supervision or review of
any institution, the selection of competent arbitrators for the case is par-
17. See e.g. Craig, Park and Paulsson, supra note 3, para. 404 at 2-3; but c.f. Goekjian,
supra note 3, at 2 (ICC arbitration still to be favored over ad hoc arbitration, but high cost
of ICC and availability of UNCITRAL and other non-institutional rules may result in
reevaluation).
18. The party contemplating amending an agreed-upon institutional arbitration clause to
provide for ad hoc arbitration would be well advised to ensure that the essential terms and
conditions of the ad hoc proceeding, including the choice of arbitral rules and, if possible,
of the arbitrators are agreed upon before giving up its right to request institutional arbitration.
See infra text accompanying notes 18-20.
19. G.A. Res. 31/98, 31 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 39) U.N. Doc. A/31/39 (1976) [hereinafter
UNCITRAL Rules].
20. It is at least theoretically possible to use the UNCITRAL Rules in an institutional
arbitration as well; the AAA has stated that it is prepared to provide services as an admin-
istrator in arbitrations held under the UNCITRAL Rules. See American Arbitration Pro-
cedures for Cases under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, reprinted in VIII YEARBOOK
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 196-99 (1983).
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ticularly crucial. It is important not only that they be capable of writing
a clear and enforceable award, but they, or at least the chairman of the
arbitration panel, be good administrators as well. One essential point to
be kept in mind in ad hoc arbitration is to provide an effective and efficient
"appointing authority" for the selection of the arbitral chairman or other
arbitrators in the event the case becomes deadlocked on this point. 2' The
appointing authority can be the ICC, 22 the president of a court or any
other appropriate neutral authority in whom the parties have confidence.
But whether ad hoc or institutional arbitration is ultimately agreed upon,
a number of further provisions in the arbitration clause can serve to
increase the ease of enforcing an eventual award and reduce uncertainty
in doing so.
II. A Global Final Award
Parties desiring all their disputes arising in connection with the contract
finally to be resolved by arbitration should ensure that their arbitration
clause specifically states that intention. The standard ICC clause 23 is
generally satisfactory for this purpose as it contains what knowledgeable
commentators have termed the three "key expressions" (i.e., "all dis-
putes . . . in connection with . . . finally settled"). 24 Perhaps more im-
portantly, these same commentators go on to point out that the ICC clause
has stood the test of time and is generally understood to intend a com-
prehensive reference to the ICC mechanism and that one must thus be
careful to ensure that any modifications to the clause cannot be construed
as indicating a different intent.2 5 Accordingly, it is probably unnecessary
21. See UNCITRAL Rules, supra note 19, art. 6. If the appointing authority has not been
designated by the parties or if the authority fails to act, the Secretary-General of the Per-
manent Court of Arbitration in the Hague may be requested to designate the appointing
authority. Id. art. 7(2)(b).
22. The ICC now has an established procedure for so doing. See ICC As APPOINTING
AUTHORITY UNDER THE UNCITRAL RULES (ICC pamphlet 1984). The cost of using the
ICC for this service is $1,000 for each request made. Id. art. 6. See also GUIDE To ARBI-
TRATION (ICC publication 382, October 1983) at 54-55. Several other arbitration institutions,
including the London Court of Arbitration and the Netherlands Arbitration Institute, have
established procedures for acting as the appointing authority under the UNCITRAL Rules.
See UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, IX YEARBOOK COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 174-77 (1984).
23. See supra note 5.
24. Craig, Park and Paulsson, supra note 3, para 6.03 at 46.
25. Id. Unfortunately the rendering of an ICC award does not preclude a party from filing
a Request for Arbitration claiming that a final ICC award failed to make certain deductions
(due to advance payments and the like) from the amount awarded, and getting the Request
before the arbitrators. This author was involved in just such a case. The defendant in the
second arbitration filed a strong and detailed motion to the ICC Court of Arbitration asking
that the Request for Arbitration be summarily rejected, as it was merely a disguised appeal,
and hence precluded, by the article 24 of the ICC Rules. The Court of Arbitration, however,
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to modify the opening of the ICC clause or to expand its three "key"
expressions. In other cases, however, it is important that the clause not
only refer controversies related to the performance of the contract and
resulting damages to arbitration, but that it also ensure that controversies
relating to the existence, validity and breach of the contract are arbitrated.
In this respect the parties would be well served by having the arbitration
clause recite:
Any dispute, controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this contract, or
the breach, termination or validity thereof shall be finally settled in accordance
with the... 26
A party also has a strong interest in further tailoring the arbitration
clause such that the eventual award is defined as including the entire
controversy between the parties, payable without deduction or offset.
This can be done by adding language such as the following:
The parties agree that the award of the arbitrator(s): shall be the sole and
exclusive remedy between them regarding any claims, counterclaims, issues or
accountings presented or pled to the arbitrator(s); that it shall be made and
promptly payable in [currency]27 free of any tax, deduction or offset...
The purpose of the above provisions is, of course, to minimize the
possibility of a party relitigating, or seeking to relitigate, matters which
have already been presented to the tribunal. 28 It should be noted that
such provisions may operate to cut off relitigation of any issue or claim
whether or not it is explicitly discussed or ruled on in the award, provided
it has been "presented or pled" to the Tribunal. It is also important to
note that the award is to be final not only as to claims and counterclaims,
but also as to "issues or accountings." Closing off further litigation on
these points may well enhance the finality of the award as many matters
forming the basis of later disputes are not always the subject of formal
claims, but often involve subsidiary issues related to offsets, retention
monies, or the like. 29
Parties selecting ICC arbitration may consider such provisions unnec-
essary as ICC Rule 24 states that submission to ICC arbitration is deemed
determined that there was "prima facie" jurisdiction to proceed under article 8(3) of the
Rules and that the defendant's motion would therefore have to be determined by the ar-
bitrators constituted to hear the case. The case was ultimately settled before the arbitrators
ruled on the defendant's motion.
26. This is, in fact, an increasingly standard formulation for reference to UNCITRAL
arbitration and is, with the addition of the word "finally," the wording recommended by
the ICC when a party wishes to use the ICC as the appointing authority under the UN-
CITRAL Rules. See ICC As APPOINTING AUTHORITY UNDER THE UNCITRAL RULES (ICC
Pamphlet 1984).
27. See supra text accompanying notes 45-47.
28. Accord, Branson and Tupman supra note 2, at 937 n. 106.
29. See, e.g., supra note 25.
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to be an undertaking to carry out the resulting award without delay and
a waiver of any right to appear insofar as such waiver can validly be
made. 30 Counsel may, however, find Article 24 difficult to assert in an
enforcement proceeding, and it does not, by its terms, cut off claims for
offsets, post award accountings and the like. 3 1
While provisions, such as those quoted above, emphasizing the final
and global nature of the award, cannot guarantee that an eventual award
enforcement proceeding will be free of burdensome, and perhaps abusive,
opposition, they can limit the opportunities for such opposition, and lessen
the risk of having to relitigate issues decided in the award. 32
III. Law and Place of Arbitration
It is relatively rare to encounter a major international contract without
a choice of substantive law clauses. 33 Most arbitration clauses do not,
30. ICC Rules, supra note 6, art. 24. In the Gotaverken v. GNMTC case the Supreme
Court of Sweden ruled that article 24 of the ICC Rules caused an ICC award rendered in
Paris to be binding and enforceable despite a subsequent challenge of the award in the
French courts. See generally Craig, Park and Paulsson, supra note 3, para. 22.03 at 137;
see also J. Paulsson, The Role of Swedish Courts in Transnational Commercial Arbitration,
VA. J. INT'L L. 211, 236 (1981) (includes English translation of Gotaverken decision); but
cf. Arab Republic of Egypt v. SPP Ltd. and SPP (Middle East) Ltd. (Hong Kong), Cour
d'Appel de Paris, July 12, 1984 (reproduced in X YEARBOOK COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION
113 (1985) (waiver of appeal under article 24 of ICC Rules recognized but award nullified
on other grounds).
31. See Island Territory of Curacao v. Solotron Devices, 356 F. Supp. I (S.D.N.Y. 1973.)
There the court rejected the defendants' "so-called counterclaim" on the basis that the
arbitrators had given the defendant credit for the equipment which was the subject of the
counterclaim. Id. at 14. The court had, however, examined the arbitral award and proceeding
in great detail concluding that "the award gives every indication of able, careful, and
impartial work by the arbitrators." Id. at 10. The judge decided largely on the basis of local
procedural rules applying to offsets. Although a result under other conditions cannot be
predicted with certainty, it appears clear that the enforcing party would have been signifi-
cantly abetted by an explicit waiver of offsets.
In a recent enforcement case experienced by the author, for instance, the defendant
admitted the final and binding nature of an ICC award rendered against it, but asserted that
its payment was subject to certain offsets arising from payments under the contract and
uncredited expenses which the arbitrators had not taken into account. The judge ultimately
rejected the defendant's offset claims as improper, but only after extensive evidentiary
hearings on the matter.
32. The omission of a finality provision in the arbitration clause would not, of course,
preclude a party from seeking to insert such a provision in the terms of reference once an
arbitration had arisen.
33. It sometimes happens that there are overlapping, and perhaps contradictory, choice
of law clauses. In one bulky contract for a large scale turnkey construction project in a
Middle Eastern country, X, the arbitration clause stated: "The arbitrators shall make their
decision in accordance with the principles of equity, law, good faith, the Parties' performance
of this Contract and the laws of X." The contract also contained a separate choice of law
clause which laconically stated: "The Laws of X shall govern this Contract." Evidently the
foreign party to the contract had sought to temper the potentially harsh effect of local law
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however, specify the procedural law to apply to the arbitration, and
many do not even specify the place of arbitration. Such definition is
important. The procedural law to be applied may be critical to the
parties' rights and, in particular, to the enforcement of the award. More-
over, the definite determination of the place and the procedural law of
the arbitration can often save much time and expense during the arbi-
tration proceeding itself.
The arbitral award is generally considered an award of the place where
it is issued, not of the place where the contract is to be performed or of
the country whose substantive law applies to the contract. Accordingly,
in designating the place of arbitration one should be careful to select a
country which has adhered to the Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, known as the "New York Con-
vention," 34 so that the award can benefit from the reciprocal enforcement
provisions in the over fifty nations who are signatories to that Conven-
tion.35 One should also, however, be careful to select ajurisdiction whose
procedural law is well adapted to international arbitration and whose
courts will not permit undue court interference with the arbitration. In
this connection, France 36 and those Swiss cantons having adopted the
Intercantonal Concordat on Arbitration 37 have been particularly favored
as having "modern" international arbitration provisions. It appears, how-
ever, that such disparate New York Convention signatories as, for ex-
by having the arbitrators' decision also reflect other and more universal concepts. See also
infra note 37. When the contract came to be arbitrated the parties ultimately agreed on
terms of reference which, essentially, incorporated both of these provisions. The case was
ultimately settled, and a judgment on agreed terms was rendered, before the arbitral tribunal
came to any decision which would have required the arbitrators to rule on the applicable
law or legal principles.
34. Done June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, TIAS No. 6997, 330 U.N.T.S. 38; see generally,
VAN DEN BERG, THE NEW YORK ARBITRAL CONVENTION OF 1958 (1981) [hereinafter van
den Berg].
35. van den Berg, supra note 34 at 410 (Annex B).
36. See N.C. P. Civ. arts. 1492-1507; see also Derains, France, VI YEARBOOK COMMER-
CIAL ARBITRATION 1-23 (1981); Derains, France, VII YEARBOOK COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION
3-15 (1982); Craig, Park and Paulsson, French Codification of a Legal Framework for In-
ternational Commercial Arbitration: the Decree of May 12, 1981, 13 LAW OF POL'Y IN
INT'L Bus. 727 (1981).
37. See Lalive, Switzerland, ARBITRATION LAW IN EUROPE 43-80 (1981). The majority
of Swiss cantons have adhered to the Concordat. Id. at 46, see also, P. JOLIDON, COM-
MENTAIRE DU CONCORDAT SUISSE SUR L'ARBITRAGE (1984).
The attractiveness of Switzerland as a venue for an international arbitration may, however,
be diminished by developments in the Geneva-based arbitration, Westland Helicopters United
v. Arab Organization for Industrialization. In that case the losing party on an interim decision
as to jurisdiction by the arbitral tribunal obtained annulment of the decision from the Geneva
Courts and, after extensive further litigation, ultimately succeeded in disqualifying the tri-
bunal that rendered the decision, on the basis that they would henceforth be prejudiced
against them by virtue of their having gotten the tribunal's decision reversed!
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ample, Kuwait 38 and Sweden 39 also allow international arbitrations a fairly
free hand in their territories and restrict appeal of the arbitral award to
their courts to quite narrow grounds.
On the other hand, a good example of a country in which to avoid
arbitration is Saudi Arabia. The newly issued Saudi Arabian Regulation
on Arbitration leaves a number of issues unclear, and there is virtually
no practical experience which resolves these uncertainties. The Regula-
tion provides for a large degree of supervision by the Saudi courts, but
there are no clear rules on the scope of court review upon attempted
enforcement of arbitral awards. Finally, Saudi Arabia is not a signatory
to the New York Convention, and thus enforcement of a Saudi arbitration
award in signatory countries is problematic. 40
In other countries international arbitration free of court interference
may be contingent upon specific waivers by the parties. Contractual par-
ties specifying international arbitration in England, for example, should
have their arbitration clause recite the so-called "exclusion agreement"
if they wish to ensure the ouster of court jurisdiction to review the sub-
stance of the award. 4 1
An arbitration clause should, therefore, always specify the "place" of
the arbitration 42 and recite any particular wording or waivers required or
desirable pursuant to the rules of that jurisdiction. Further, to remove
any possible ambiguity the clause should also state that "the law appli-
38. See Chaudhri and Sifri, Arbitration in Kuwait: Procedures and Options, MIDDLE
EAST EXECUTIVE REPORTS, September 1985 at 14-17.
39. See generally Dworen, Sweden, ARBITRATION LAW IN EUROPE 327-42 (1981).
40. Chaudri and Clodfelter, Commercial Arbitration in the Kingdom, MIDDLE EAST Ex-
ECUTIVE REPORTS, July 1985 at 9,20. Faced with this set of circumstances it is little wonder
that private foreign parties contracting together in Saudi Arabia frequently discreetly provide
for their disputes to be settled by arbitration outside that Kingdom, despite the fact that
such provisions are not permitted in any contract which must be registered with the Saudi
authorities. Id. at 9.
41. The "exclusion agreement" clause recommended by the London Court of Arbitration
in the 1981 edition of its International Arbitration Rules reads as follows:
The parties agree to exclude any right of application or appeal to the English Courts in
connection with any question of law arising in the course of the arbitration or with respect
to any award made.
It should be noted that exclusion agreements apply to international commercial arbitration
and that predispute exclusion agreements are void for so-called "special category" contracts
in the areas of maritime, insurance, or commodity agreements. See 1979 Arbitration Act.
Section 4 (a). Although article 24 of the ICC Rules contains an explicit waiver of appeal, it
appears, for the time being at least, that parties providing for ICC arbitration in England
should, nevertheless, include an explicit "Exclusion" provision in the arbitration clause.
See Craig, Park and Paulsson, supra note 3, para. 8.13 at 82 (Release 84-1, June 1984); but
see, Arab Energy Corporation Ltd. v. Olieprodukten Nederland B.V., (High Court, Queens
Bench Division, Commercial Court); 2 Lloyd's L. Rep. 419 (1983).
42. Which does not generally preclude hearings being held in another place if it becomes
convenient or necessary.
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cable to the arbitration procedure shall be determined by referring to the
law of the place of arbitration."
IV. Provisions on Notice, Satisfaction
and Sovereign Immunity
A. NOTICE
At the time of signing a contract, notice provisions between the parties
generally seem a rather perfunctory matter: the parties are in contact and
have a common interest in communication. The situation is often quite dif-
ferent when relations have deteriorated to the point that one party invokes
arbitration. This is particularly the case when there has been a change of
management or ownership in a private party, or when there has been a rev-
olution or other political change in a state party. The issue of proper notice
was, for example, frequently pled by the government of the Islamic Republic
of Iran in the disputes which followed the 1979 revolution in that country.
The issue is particularly likely to arise when an arbitration claimant, in the
absence of any appearance or answer from its opponent, obtains an arbitra-
tion award in a default proceeding and the losing party then tries to set aside
or resist enforcement of the award on the basis that it was not given proper
notice to appear.43 This issue may be further complicated in an institutional
arbitration, because an administrative body is also involved."
Many of these problems can be diminished, and potential delay and confusion
avoided, by having a notice provision in the arbitration clause itself. This notice
provision need not be identical with the notice provision for other communi-
cations under the contract and may provide for service on a different or sup-
plementary party representative. For example, a state party may wish that a
request for arbitration be served on its Ministry of Justice; a private party may
wish service, or duplicate service, on its general counsel or attorneys.
B. CURRENCY OF THE AWARD
The enforcement of an international arbitration award is likely to be
simpler, and give rise to fewer accounting disputes, if the award is made
43. See Maritime International Nominees Establishment v. Republic of Guinea, 693 F.2d
1094 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
44. In the case of one ICC arbitration award involving a default judgment against a Middle
Eastern government ministry, the losing party argued that enforcement should not be allowed
because the ICC had not sent a copy of an important notice to the country's embassy at
the place of arbitration. This argument was ultimately rejected, largely due to the fact that
the defendant in the enforcement proceeding had signed the terms of reference and could
not therefore convincingly plead ignorance of the arbitration. The result might well have
been different for a default award in which the defendant had never appeared in the proceeding.
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in one currency; this requirement can be specified in the arbitration clause.
Such a requirement does not mean that all pleadings and accountings must
be stated in that currency, rather it directs the arbitrators to convert, to
the extent necessary, their final award into the stipulated currency. It may,
of course, be difficult for one party to accept the principle of an award
in a single, (possibly foreign) currency; particularly when for a number
of reasons the contract price may involve two or more currencies. 4 5 How-
ever, when it can be negotiated, a specification of the currency of an
award will render the award cheaper and easier to enforce.
U.S. dollars are often a particularly desirable currency for the award,
because the exchange rate for the dollar is readily ascertainable and many
arbitral institutions, notably the ICC, calculate and charge costs in U.S.
dollars. 46 Furthermore, some or all of a party's seizable assets, wherever
located, are frequently denominated in U.S. dollars, thereby making en-
forcement simpler and eliminating or at least reducing currency fluctuation
risks.4 7 An award in any other readily convertible or "hard" currency
should, however, also be acceptable, and the circumstances, including
the probable country of enforcement, may dictate the choice of a particular
currency for the award.
C. INTEREST AND COSTS
Parties routinely request that the award bear interest, and often also
claim so-called "prejudgment" interest, or interest on damages from the
date they were incurred. Not infrequently the party's right to interest,
and the applicable rate of interest, become a heavily pled and debated
issue in the arbitration proceeding. Arbitration awards, nevertheless, do
not always specify interest, or else may grant it at a rate considerably
lower than the commercial rate.4 8 Where no interest is specified in the
45. When one party perceives the exchange risk not to be in its favor agreement as to
the currency may be similarly difficult to reach.
46. See ICC Rules, supra note 6, Appendix 111, "Schedule of Conciliation and Arbitration
Costs." These costs may be applied in turn, to part of the eventual award. Id. Art. 20.
47. In one enforcement of an ICC award in which this author was involved the assets of
the losing party, which were located in Europe, consisted of payments due from a European
utility for oil and gas shipments from the Middle East. These sums were all denominated
in U.S. dollars, and it was therefore dollars which were effectively seized. Unfortunately,
other than the allocated portion of the ICC's costs, the award was denominated in Sterling.
This ultimately resulted in a complicated conversion from dollars into local currency and
an ultimate reconversion into Sterling. Furthermore, the defendant succeeded in blocking
the transfer of the seized assets for approximately three months, during which time the
value of the Pound rose against the Dollar, and the executing party therefore incurred a
significant exchange loss in Sterling.
48. See, e.g., AGIP Company S.p.A. v. Government of the Popular Republic of the Congo,
reprinted in VII YEARBOOK COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 133, 142-43 (1983) (interest rate
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award, the issue is generally determined by the local law (either the law
of the place of arbitration or the place where enforcement is sought), a
situation that is likely to lead to further disagreement and, possibly, ad-
ditional litigation. Moreover, where interest does not clearly run on the
award, or runs at a low rate, the party against whom enforcement is sought
may well perceive it to be in its financial interest to delay enforcement
as long as possible.
These problems can be addressed in the arbitration clause. The clause
may specify that the award shall include interest from the date of any
damages arising from the breach or other violation of the contract (so-
called "prejudgment interest") and that the award itself shall bear interest
until paid in full. The inclusion of a prejudgment interest provision in the
arbitration clause is, admittedly, unusual and makes the clause, and the
rendering of the award, somewhat more complicated. 49 Parties concerned
about the complexity or acceptability of a prejudgment interest provision
may opt for a simpler clause providing only that the award shall bear post-
judgment interest. The omission of a prejudgment interest requirement in
the arbitration clause would not, of course, preclude a party from claiming
for it in the arbitration proceeding itself.
In either event an interest provision in an arbitration clause should
specify that interest be at a commercial rate not lower than some readily
identifiable index such as LIBOR or the "prime rate" of a designated
U.S. bank. While obviously not a required element in an arbitration clause,
the interest provision will both make enforcement of the award with in-
terest simpler and render it less advantageous for the losing party to resist
or delay enforcement.
It is also worthwhile to provide that costs of enforcement will, to the
maximum extent possible, be charged to the party resisting enforcement.
The "costs" of enforcement should normally include any court costs,
judgment registration fees, or taxes. In certain jurisdictions such fees can
be substantial. In Belgium, for instance, the exequatur of an arbitral award
entails the payment of a judgment registration tax50 presently equal to
2.5% of the face amount of the award. Moreover, this sum must be paid
calculated at "lowest rates in effect during the relevant periods on the markets concerned");
see also Arbitral Award of July 23, 1981, extract reprinted in VII YEARBOOK COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION 89, 94 (1983) (arbitrators fix rate of interest halfway between rate claimed
and that offered by defendant.)
49. However, the Second Circuit has ruled that the presumption in favor of prejudgment
interest applies to arbitral award enforcement under the New York Convention. See Water-
side Ocean Navigation Co., Inc. v. Internation Navigation Ltd., 737 F. 2d 150, 154 (2nd Cir.
1984); see also Note, Post-Award Interest under the New York Convention: the Laurentian
Forest, I ARBITRATION INTERNATIONAL 190 (1985).
50. Codes des Droits d'Enregistrement, art. 148.
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in advance by the enforcing party in order to have an exequatur order
issued.51 While local procedural rules typically assign such costs to the
losing party, a party opposing the award is, logically, also going to oppose
paying costs of enforcement. Consequently, the party seeking enforce-
ment will be abetted by a clear stipulation that "all costs, fees, or taxes
incident to enforcing the award shall, to the maximum extent permitted
by law, be charged against the party resisting such enforcement."
D. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
Where a state, state agency, or other possibly sovereign party enters
into the contract, the private party should insist that the arbitration clause
contain not only an explicit waiver of immunity from jurisdiction but also
a waiver of immunity as to the execution of the award. This is necessary
because in various major jurisdictions, including the United States, 52 the
fact that a state or state agency enters into a commercial contract con-
taining an arbitration clause generally is not considered to constitute a
waiver of sovereign immunity from execution and related proceedings.
While the availability of enforcement in a given jurisdiction will still de-
pend upon the statutory or common-law provisions and policies of the
enforcement jurisdiction, on the nature of the seized assets, and on the
identity of the governmental entity against whom enforcement is sought,
an explicit and detailed waiver of sovereign immunity nevertheless will,
at the very least, greatly circumscribe the arguments of a state party in
resisting enforcement.
V. Conclusion: Model Clauses
Based on the points discussed above a model clause for ICC arbitration
could provide as follows:
51. Id. at art. 142 and art. 302 quater.
52. The recently introduced Mathias Amendment to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act seeks to address precisely this problem by providing that "(a)n agreement to arbitrate
shall be deemed to constitute consent to proceedings to recognize, confirm, or enforce by
levy, attachment or otherwise any arbitral award made pursuant to such agreement . . . and
neither the Federal Act of State doctrine nor the doctrine of sovereign immunity shall
constitute grounds or be the basis for refusal or deferral of recognition, confirmation, or
enforcement. ... S. 1395, 99th Congress, Ist Sess. (1985). Cf. Pavlis, International Ar-
bitration and the Inapplicability of the Act of State Doctrine, 14 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. &
PoL'Y 65 (1981) (comprehensive discussion concluding that U.S. Act of State Doctrine
should not be defense to enforcement of an arbitral award under New York Convention).
This problem has already largely been addressed by statute in the United Kingdom. See
State Immunity Act, 1978, Ch. 33, § 9. See generally Crawford, Les Etats et lexecution des
sentences Arbitrales dans les Droits Americains et Anglais, REVUE DE L'ARBIrRAGE 689-
702 (1985).
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All disputes arising in connection with the present contract shall be finally settled
under the Rules of Conciliation and Arbitration of the International Chamber
of Commerce as presently in force, 53 by one or more arbitrators appointed in
accordance with said Rules.
54
The place of arbitration shall be -, and the law applicable to the arbitration
procedure shall be determined by referring to the law of the place of arbitration.
The arbitrator(s) shall determine the matters in dispute in accordance with the
law of __ .55 The Janguage shall be used throughout the arbitral
proceedings.
The parties agree that the award of the arbitrator(s): shall be the sole and
exclusive remedy between them regarding any claims, counterclaims, issues or
accountings presented or pled to the arbitrator(s); that it shall be made and shall
promptly be payable in U.S. dollars free of any tax, deduction or offset; and
that any costs, fees or taxes incident to enforcing the award shall, to the max-
imum extent permitted by law, be charged against the party resisting such
enforcement.
The award shall include interest from the date of any damages incurred for
breach or other violation of the contract, and from the date of the award until
paid in full, at a rate to be fixed by the arbitrator(s), but in no event less than
the London Interbank Offering Rate (LIBOR) per annum quoted for the cor-
responding period by 56 in the London Interbank Market of United States
Dollars for immediately available funds.
All notices by one party to the other in connection with the arbitration shall be
in writing and shall be deemed to have been duly given or made if delivered or
mailed by registered air mail, return receipt requested, or by telex, to the
following addresses: [addresses of the parties].
The above clause can be readily adapted for ad hoc arbitration or
arbitration with another arbitration institution. Where the parties opt for
ad hoc arbitration under the UNCITRAL rules, for instance, the first
paragraph, above, could be replaced by the following:
53. Parties willing to accept future changes or evolutions in the ICC Rules may wish to
omit the words "presently in force." See generally, Craig, Park and Paulsson, supra note
3, para 6.03 at 46.
54. Where the parties know that they desire a sole arbitrator or a three-arbitrator panel
they may so specify. Where the parties have specific requirements as to the arbitrators
background, nationality (eg., that the Chairman be of a different nationality than the parties),
or qualifications, these also can and should be specified.
55. Where the parties are particularly concerned about changes which may occur in the
applicable law they may add the words ". . . as in force and effect on the date of this
agreement." The effect of local law may, where agreed, be somewhat attenuated by adding
language such as ". .. and such [customary rules] or [rules of international law] as may
apply." But cf. supra note 33 (overlapping choice of law clauses).
56. One or more stable reference banks should be inserted here. Should the parties wish
to use the U.S. "prime rate" they could incorporate the following clause:
"1... in no event less than the prime commercial lending rate announced by [name(s) of
bank(s)] at their principal office(s) in [location] for 90-day loans for responsible and
substantial commercial borrowers."
See, Branson and Tupman supra, note 2 at 937.
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Any dispute, controversy, or claim arising out of or relating to this contract or
the breach, interpretation, termination, or validity thereof shall be settled by
final and binding arbitration in accordance with the UNCITRAL Arbitration
Rules as currently in force. The appointing authority shall be [name of arbitral
institution, court or other authority].
Where the contract in question is with a sovereign state or state agency,
the private party would be well advised to add a detailed waiver of sov-
ereign immunity:5 7
The government of 58 hereby irrevocably waives any claim to immunity
in regard to any proceedings in connection with an arbitration or arbitral award
pursuant to this Agreement, including, without limitation, immunity from ser-
vice of process, immunity from pre- or post-judgment attachment, immunity
from jurisdiction of any court, and immunity of any of its property from
execution. 59
The clauses suggested above have been drafted with particular regard
to enhancing the ease and speed of enforcing an arbitral award and min-
imizing the costs thereof. The clauses are, however, also likely to result
in the arbitration proceeding itself being speedier and more cost-effective. 6°
This is because numerous matters which can, and often do, result in delay
and argument, such as the selection of arbitrators, language, place of
arbitration, applicable procedural rules, interest and currency, are already
provided for in significant detail.
The suggested clauses will enhance the efficiency of an international
arbitration proceeding and render avoidance and delay in paying the award
more difficult. The clauses should not, however, be considered as favoring
arbitration itself, much less one or the other party to the contract (at the
time of signing the contract it is not at all clear who is more likely to be
the eventual claimant or that the claimant will be able to overcome any
counterclaims). Rather, the clauses should be viewed as eliminating much
of the uncertainty in dispute resolution and thereby as generally reducing
costs and delays for both parties. Indeed, the parties, by knowing in detail
the nature and consequences of arbitration, will be better positioned to
resolve their differences without having to resort to it.
57. See generally Crawford and Johnson, Arbitrating with Foreign Governments and Their
Instrumentalities, INT'L FIN. L. REV. (April 1986).
58. Where appropriate, the name of the specific governmental entity signing the contract
should be filled in here.
59. The suggested waiver of sovereign immunity may appear both overly broad and
detailed and may therefore be difficult for a governmental party to accept. Private parties
to contracts with sovereign entities should, however, take note that claims of sovereign
immunity are, in many jurisdictions, very difficult to overcome and that their chances of
so doing will be enhanced by a specific and detailed waiver.
60. See generally discussion and model clause proposed in Branson and Tupman, supra
note 2.
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